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Past episodes of energy insecurity have been fleeting and the fears have been assuaged by 
market forces or technical change.  This paper analyses the nature of the EU's current 
energy security problems, emphasising the increased importance of natural gas and high 
level of dependence on Russian supplies through a small number of pipelines.  Building 
alternative pipeline routes is expensive and with finite reserves in any gas field pipelines may 
be mutually exclusive; especially since China has entered the market for Central Asian gas, 
new non-Russian pipelines to the EU may not be economically feasible.  However, global 
gas reserves are large, and high energy prices in the 2000s encouraged investment in 
alternative delivery modes, notable liquefied natural gas (LNG).  As a spot market for LNG 
emerges EU energy-importing countries may face volatile prices, but will not be exposed to 




1.   Energy security in the EU and Beyond 
 
 
Energy security is often presented as a clear and present danger, but episodes of energy 
insecurity have been fleeting and the fears have been soothed by market forces or technical 
change.  This paper emphasises the shifting nature of energy security.  It analyses the 
nature of the EU's current energy security problems, and the forces that will nullify energy 
security concerns. 
The paper starts by analysing the nature of energy security, paying particular attention to the 
oil crisis of the 1970s and to current EU concerns about security of gas supplies controlled by 
Russia.  The energy crises of the 1970s had two dimensions: an energy security aspect 
embodied in the Arab oil embargo of countries supporting Israel in the 1973 War and a 
cartel-driven increase it the relative price of oil.  The energy security threat was brief, as the 
Arab oil embargo lasted less than six months and was terminated without achieving a 
primary goal of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.  The oil price increases of the 
1970s led to demand and supply responses which produced an oil glut by 1986, and the 
plethora of suppliers ensured availability of supply at the world price.  The 1998-2008 
oilboom had winners and losers, but did not have an energy security dimension; any oil-
importing country could obtain as much oil as it wanted at the world price.  Meanwhile, the 
EU had become increasingly reliant on gas imports from Russia, and the disruption of those 
supplies in January 2006 and more seriously in January 2009 raised concerns about energy 
security, especially as Russia had become increasingly assertive since the turn of the 
century. 
A feature of oil and gas markets is that both supply and demand respond slowly to price 
changes, so that any small shift in demand or supply conditions causes a larger short-term 
change in prices.  In the longer term, however, new sources of supply will be discovered and 
exploited, and energy-users will adopt energy-saving measures or will turn to alternative 
sources of energy.  The surest form of energy security is when alternative supplies can be 
called upon at relatively low additional cost, but investment in new energy projects is typically 
lumpy and expensive, whether exploring and exploiting new oil or gas fields or building new 
pipelines.  Thus in the short term there is typically a trade-off between costs and security, 
which is complicated by uncertainty about future prices and technology which will impact on 
the financial returns from large investment projects. 
The particular features of the gas trade that underlie the current EU energy security fears 
arise from pipelines being the dominant delivery mode and from specific features of the 




Russia) a dominant supplier position.
1  Because pipelines are expensive to build and have no 
alternative uses, the contractors require a long-term commitment from both sides on the 
amount to be traded and the price to be paid.  Given the current pipeline network to the EU, 
when gas supplies from Russia are disrupted there is in the short-term no alternative, while 
in the longer term EU buyers are committed to purchasing minimum quantities from Russia 
at the agreed price. 
The apparent stability is, however, misleading.  Gazprom is a business whose profitability is 
threatened by declining reserves in existing gas fields and by diminishing ability to purchase 
gas from Central Asia at lower prices than it receives for its exports to the EU.  Although 
pipelines are expensive, new ones can be built and the EU has options of supporting 
different pipelines from Russia or Central Asia even though it may be in competition with 
other energy importers, notably China.  Finally, pipelines will lose their position as the 
dominant transport mode as alternative delivery modes, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
become technologically and economically feasible; once LNG is readily available by takers 
from a variety of suppliers, any supplier will have difficulty targeting individual buyers.  This 
paper examines each of these prospects, and its implications for EU energy security. 
 
 
2.   Energy Security: A Shifting Concept 
 
 
Energy security has meant different things in different eras.  Before 1914 coal was king; 
Stanley Jevons (1865) worried about the "Coal Question", or whether Britain's diminishing 
coal reserves would undermine its status as a Great Power.  Even in the 1950s the Coal and 
Steel Community was a key precursor of the EU; France, West Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux countries believed that, if coal production were supervised by a supranational 
commission, a third intra-European war would be less possible. Such concerns about coal 
security now seem quaint because technical change has diversified our primary energy 
sources. Recognizing the increasing importance of nuclear power, the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) was established in 1957 as one of the European 
Communities, although in practice it remained a minor institution and nuclear power's 
                                                 
1 Here and at several later points Russia and Gazprom are used interchangeably.  Gazprom became a joint stock 
company in 1993 with the government as the main shareholder; the government share was gradually increased 
until it reached 51% in 2005.  While it is clear that Gazprom at times operates as an arm of Russian foreign policy, 
there are also occasions when Gazprom is serving its own interests or those of its top officials (who may be 
serving the interest of senior Russian politicians).  No attempt is made to disentangle these skeins of decision-




acceptance has been constrained by safety concerns (highlighted for Europeans by the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster), i.e. a different type of security concern. 
In 1973-4 oil took centre-stage with the Arab boycott of countries supporting Israel, which 
was accompanied by OPEC-driven oil price increases.  The Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) had been formed in 1960, principally to coordinate negotiations 
with the seven integrated oil companies that dominated the industry at that time.  Following 
the outbreak of a new round of Arab-Israel conflict on 6 October 1973, the Arab members of 
OPEC plus Egypt and Syria announced an embargo on oil supplies to countries supporting 
Israel.  The embargo was initially targeted at the USA, which was airlifting replacement 
equipment and supplies to Israel, but could apply to any other country.  Some European 
nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the US Middle East policy, but 
the embargo was extended to include the Netherlands which provided landing facilities for 
US aircraft supplying Israel.  More or less simultaneously, OPEC ministers announced an 
increase in their target price of oil and began production cuts.
2  The market price of oil rose 
rapidly from $3 to $12 per barrel, and it remained above this level for the remainder of the 
1970s (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Crude oil prices 1960-2008 (current and constant 2008 USD) 
 
 
Note: 1960-1983 Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura and Dated Brent since 1984. 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2009. 
 
                                                 
2 The chronology is clouded by distinctions between formal announcements of the embargo and of OPEC actions 
as a cartel to affect price through quantity restrictions, and by the role of Saudi Arabia as the key actor in both 
cases.  According to Yergin (1991, 597) the Saudi government in secret meetings with the Egyptian leadership in 
August 1973 had already committed itself to using the oil weapon in the event of renewed Arab-Israel warfare, 
although the embargo was only announced in response to US decisions in October 12-19 to airlift material 
support and commit $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel.  The OPEC price increases and production cuts were 




The 1973-4 oil price increase was a global economic shock.  The magnitude of the price 
increase constituted a large negative supply shock for oil-importing countries and contributed 
to the dismal combination of stagnation and inflation that characterized the rest of the 1970s 
for the high-income countries. Oil exporters benefited from the higher prices, although in 
some cases inexperience in using the windfall led to "resource curse" outcomes and the 
world economy had trouble recycling the large new source of global savings. 
In the energy security context, the most dramatic element of the post-1973 energy crisis was 
concern that the western countries could be held to ransom by a handful of oil-rich Middle 
Eastern countries.  The situation was highlighted, despite its brevity, by the Arab oil 
embargo, and later in the decade and in the 1980s by the increased assertiveness of Iran 
and Libya (and of the Soviet Union, which invaded Afghanistan in December 1979).  In the 
event, however, concerns about the new global power of oil producing nations proved to be 
exaggerated.  Their economic power increased, as would be the case for any country which 
experienced a sudden multiplication of the value of its resource base, and increased wealth 
could be spent on foreign adventures or provide a platform for discarding foreign influence 
without worrying about the consequences.  However, the oil-exporting countries' strategic 
ability to obtain political goals by threatening oil-importing countries' energy security was 
fleeting; the Arab oil embargo was lifted in March 1974 and has not been reimposed since 
then.
3 
Conditions in the world oil market before 1973 had not been favourable to the producing 
countries.  From 1947 to 1967 the world price in US dollars increased by less than two 
percent per year, barely keeping pace with inflation and discouraging exploration for new oil 
fields.  Between 1967 and 1973, as the US dollar came under increased pressure and was 
devalued substantially against other major currencies after December 1971, the value of 
dollar-denominated oil exports fell relative to the cost of manufactured imports from Germany 
or Japan.  Irrespective of the geopolitical situation, the oil exporters were in a strong position 
once they chose to flex their muscles and support oil price increases by managing supply.  
The world price  of oil remained in the mid-teens from 1974 until 1979, when a fresh round of 
OPEC-driven supply restrictions pushed the price up to almost $40. 
Oil consumers responded by adopting oil-saving technologies as their factories or equipment 
were renovated and by buying more fuel-efficient cars when it came time to trade in their car.  
Hydropower, natural gas and other alternatives became more important as primary energy 
sources.  The historically high oil prices provided an incentive to find new deposits, and to 
develop techniques to better recover oil in adverse conditions, as in Alaska or beneath the 
                                                 
3 The USA began a parallel set of negotiations with Arab oil producers to end the embargo and with Egypt, Syria 
and Israel to arrange Israel's withdrawal from some of the territories occupied since 1967.  With the promise of a 
negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria, the Arab oil producers lifted the embargo in March 1974.  The 




North Sea or the Gulf of Mexico (the Canadian tar sands also entered the picture, although 
the combination of technology and price has yet to make them really economical).  By 1986 
there was an oil glut; prices dropped to around $10 per barrel and remained there until 1998.  
The important point is that market forces worked, but because of the nature of both demand 
and supply the time lags were measured in years. 
With lower prices, there was less incentive to invest in oil, and eventually a new cycle began 
as demand outstripped supply.  The extent of the sustained price increase over the next 
decade was unforeseen; oil prices peaked at over $140 in spring 2008.  However, there was 
no security of supply issue.  All oil-users could obtain as much oil as they wanted as long as 
they were prepared to pay the price.  There were some concerns about over-dependence on 
the Middle East and on increasingly important Russian oil, reflected in pipeline projects to 
access oil supply from Central Asia and the Caucasus; notably the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline which opened in 2005 and the pipeline across Kazakhstan to China, but these could 
be economically justified at the high oil prices, and the former was as much about reducing 
the CIS oil exporting countries' dependence on transiting Russia as about security of supply 
for the West; indeed once oil reaches the Turkish port of Ceyhan it can be shipped by tanker 
to anywhere in the world. 
In sum, the 1998-2008 oil price increase was an important economic event with winners and 
losers, but less drastic than the 1973-4 and 1979-80 oil price increases because both buyers 
and sellers were better prepared for the challenges involved.  It was neither an oil crisis nor a 
security challenge, because by 1998 OPEC supplied less than half of the world's oil and 
transport by tanker meant that no country could hold another hostage by controlling the 
transport routes.  The 1970s oil price hikes encouraged exploration and new entrants into the 
world oil market and the next big increase in oil prices in 1998-2008 saw no physical supply 
problem; any customer could purchase oil at the world market price. 
In the early 21st. century, energy security issues have centred on gas, especially for the EU.  
They were highlighted on 1 January 2006 when Gazprom reduced gas supply levels to 
Ukraine, and about 100 million cubic metres that was expected in countries west of Ukraine 
was not delivered.  Although the supply interruption only lasted three days and was relatively 
easily coped with from available storage and through fuel-switching, the interruptions raised 
concerns in Europe regarding energy security (Whist, 2008, 9).  Such concerns were re-
ignited in January 2009 by a more serious disruption of gas supply from Russia following a 
commercial dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the size of gas debts owed by 
Ukraine, the price to be paid by Ukraine for Russian gas and the transit fee to be paid by 
Russia on gas passing through Ukraine to the EU.  On 1 January 2009 Russia cut off gas to 
Ukraine, and within a few days EU members were reporting reduced pressure in their 




supplies from Russia reached the EU.  In both 2006 and 2009 the EU was caught as a 
bystander in a bilateral dispute, which could happen again, or Russia might use the threat of 








Use of natural gas as a fuel has expanded rapidly since 1973, and especially over the last 
two decades.  The trend has been especially pronounced in the EU, where gas accounted 
for less than 5% of energy consumption in the early 1970s, and about one quarter today.  EU 
consumption increased from under 350 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 1995 to 500 bcm in 
2005.
5 
In the 1990s the EU was about 60% self-sufficient in gas, but self-sufficiency dropped 
sharply in the 2000s.  Output in the largest EU producer, the United Kingdom, began to 
decline after 2000 as its reserves ran out; the UK produced 108 bcm in 2000 and less than 
70 bcm in 2008.  The next largest EU producers in 2008 were the Netherlands (68 bcm), 
Germany (13 bcm), Romania 12 bcm and Denmark (10 bcm).  Total EU output of around 190 
bcm in 2008 covered less than 40% of EU consumption.  External supply is heavily 
concentrated, with Russia, Norway and Algeria accounting for about 26%, 17% and 11% of 
EU consumption respectively, and all other suppliers about 5%.
6 
The problem with reliance on external sources of gas is that there is no world market, which 
reflects the importance of bilateral delivery agreements and the difficulty of rerouting 
supplies.  Prices quoted for the US Henry Hub, Alberta, the UK, EU and liquid natural gas 
(LNG) delivered to Japan differ substantially, e.g. the 2008 EU price was $353 and the 
Alberta price $224 per thousand cubic metres. Because pipelines are the dominant transport 
mode, much gas trade is under long-term contracts specifying price and quantity negotiated 
as part of a pipeline construction agreement.  Gas is to some extent a substitute for oil, so 
that oil and gas prices trend together but the prevalence of long-term agreements means that 
                                                 
4 As many Russian policymakers pointed out, the idea that Russia would cut off gas supplies may be paranoid, 
since Russia cannot easily sell the gas elsewhere.  The three weeks' lost sales to the EU in January 2009 cost 
Gazprom around $2 billion.  For more details of the 2009 dispute and on the impact on EU members, see the 
European Communities Commission Staff Working Document The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the 
EU: An Assessment 
http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/documents/alle_emner/energi/2009_ser2_autre_document_travail_service_part1_ve
r2.pdf (accessed 3 January 2010). 
5 Unless otherwise stated, all energy data are from BP Statistical Review of  World Energy 2009 - available online 
at http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 




gas prices are much stickier and respond to oil price increases with a lag.  This was very 
clear in the 1998-2005 phase of the last oilboom, and especially so in the web of 
arrangements involving European and CIS gas markets. 
The price of EU gas imports from Russia is based on a formula which includes the price of 
oil.  The explicit link meant that the delivered (cif) price of Russian gas in the EU increased 
from a low of $50 in 1999 to $353 in 2008, and has subsequently declined.  The increase in 
prices brought a windfall gain to Russia.  However, the monopoly Russian supplier Gazprom 
was obliged to supply domestic consumers at a far lower price, and domestic demand 
hampered its ability to maximize profits on EU sales.  In 2006, for example, the wholesale 
prices charged to domestic industrial consumers averaged $44 per thousand m
3 and 
residential consumers paid much less, while the price of gas exported to the EU was on 
average $240 per thousand m
3 (Locatelli, 2008, 11).
7   
An important link in Gazprom's strategy has been to import gas from Central Asia to supply 
CIS customers such as Ukraine as well as Russia, and hence release Russian gas for sale 
to the EU.  According to Ariel Cohen (2008, 168), Central Asian gas accounts for 22% of 
Russian exports to Europe.  Imports from Central Asia are primarily from Turkmenistan, 
whose gas production is the second largest in the CIS.
8  The lower the price paid for 
Turkmen gas and the greater the amount of Turkmen gas that could be sold to Russian 
domestic consumers, the higher Gazprom’s profitability. 
Up until 2005 the intra-CIS gas trade was highly non-transparent, with shady intermediaries 
and barter arrangements.  Within Russia, gas markets during the 1990s were opaque; until 
1999 Gazprom was not allowed to disconnect companies for non-payment and accounts 
were often settled by offsets or by barter, with great scope for corruption.
9  On intra-CIS trade 
Gazprom paid inflated prices to intermediaries, which benefitted well-connected individuals.
10  
After Vladimit Putin became President in June 2000, one of his first steps was to replace the 
senior Gazprom management (Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin and CEO Rem Vyakhirev) by 
                                                 
7 Spanjer (2007) and Tsygankova (2008) analyse the impact of the proposed gradual introduction of netback 
pricing (i.e. linking Russian domestic price to the export price minus transport costs) between 2008 and 2011.   
Apart from reducing consumption (452bcm in 2006) and improving Gazprom’s balance sheet, the price increases 
are connected to Russia’s WTO accession negotiations in which underpriced domestic gas has been a major 
issue.  Russia also underpriced gas exports to former Soviet republics, but prices were substantially increased for 
the Baltic countries in 2005, for Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2006 and for Belarus in 
2007; Gazprom intends to bring prices for all of these customers up to levels that provide equal profitability to 
sales to EU customers by 2011. 
8 Turkmenistan exports 75% of its gas.  Uzbekistan produces similar amounts (65 bcm in 2007), but with over five 
times the population of Turkmenistan it consumes most of this domestically and only exported 15 bcm in 2007.  
Kazakhstan has had much lower output, 13 bcm in 2007, almost all of which is consumed domestically, but has 
potential to increase gas output substantially in the coming years. 
9 According to Judith Thornton (2009, 15-16) over half of payments in 1996 were by offsets or barter. 
10 In 2000 Itera (International Trading Energy and Resources Association) bought Turkmenistan gas for $35.37 
per thousand cubic metres, and sold about a third of it to Gazprom for $45 per thousand cubic metres.  The main 
holding company of Itera was registered in the Dutch Antilles with over 60% of the shares held in trust for 
unnamed individuals, one of whom turned out to be a former Deputy Prime Minister of Turkmenistan and others 




his own close associates (Dmitry Medvedev  and  Alexei Miller), with the aim of reducing 
asset-stripping and tax evasion and centralizing control over energy rents, but arrangements 
for intra-CIS gas trade remained very opaque.
11    
During the 1990s, when the bargaining position of energy exporters was weak, 
Turkmenistan's customers often settled their bills through barter agreements or simply did 
not pay, leading to Turkmenistan cutting off supplies to Ukraine from March 1997 until 
January 1999 (Sagers, 1999).  Anecdotes of low quality or unusable goods being supplied to 
satisfy the barter terms abound.  In one 1990s deal Ukraine supplied twelve million galoshes 
in payment for gas; this was to a nation of four million people living in the desert!  At the core 
of these arrangements was the rampant corruption in Ukraine, centred on energy imports 
(Babanin, Dubrovskiy and Ivaschenko, 2004); managers of inefficient state-owned or recently 
privatized enterprises would provide unsellable goods in return for gas which had a market 
value.  Many barter goods were passed on; after Russia received Volvo cars in a barter deal 
with Sweden in the early 1990s, Turkmenistan received Volvo cars in payment for exports to 
Russia.  The role of intermediaries and of barter began to decline after Ukraine's Orange 
Revolution in late 2004 and early 2005.
12 
In 2002 Russia tried to take advantage of the opaque nature of Turkmenistan’s gas deals 
and its control over pipelines by locking Turkmenistan into a long-term agreement at what 
was already a low price ($44 per thousand m
3, half in hard currency and half barter).  As a 
rule of thumb, the true value of barter may be half its contract value, which would bring the 
true price for the gas in 2003-5 down to $33 per 1,000 m
3.  As oil prices and the price 
received by Gazprom for gas exports to the EU increased, Turkmenistan sought to improve 
the terms of its gas sales to Russia.  In December 2004 Turkmenistan stopped gas supplies 
to Russia and demanded a price of $58 per 1,000 m
3, expecting that Gazprom’s inability to 
meet its export and domestic commitments without Turkmen gas would force it to offer better 
terms, but Gazprom survived the rest of the winter without Turkmen supplies.  In April 2005 
                                                 
11 After the Gazprom senior management was revamped, Itera lost the Turkmenistan contract to TransUral Gas.  
According to Blank (2003), under Moscow’s 2003 deal with Turkmenistan: "A large quantity of Turkmen gas will 
be shipped through Russia to Ukraine by a little-known gas company, TransUral, whose major stockholder, 
Semyon Mogilevich, is one of Russia’s most notorious criminal kingpins. The Trans-Ural firm will earn from $320 
million to $1 billion from this deal alone. And all the firms involved, including Gazprom, already are contributing to 
Putin’s reelection."  On the Turkmenistan side most of the revenue went into non-transparent off-budget funds, 
including a Deutsche Bank account in Frankfurt in the Turkmenistan President’s name.  TransUral Gas was 
displaced in 2004 in favour of RosUkrEnergo, a 50-50 joint venture between Gazprom and a consortium of 
unnamed Ukrainian and Russian businessmen represented by Austria’s Raffeisen Bank; Mogilevich was reputed 
to have a major interest in RosUkrEnergo.  Although Mogilevich was put on the FBI’s most wanted list in 2003 for 
fraud, he lived openly in Moscow until he was arrested in January 2008 on tax evasion charges.  The arrest 
appeared to be a prelude to the March 2008 agreement which eliminated intermediaries from the Russia-Ukraine 
gas trade. 
12 The new head of the Ukrainian gas company, Naftohaz Ukrainy, announced that the contract with 
Turkmenistan active from 1
st. July 2005 would involve no barter terms.  The January 2006 Russia-Ukraine energy 
dispute ended with what appeared to be a definitive movement towards cash payments on gas transactions 
involving Russia, Ukraine and Turkmenistan, although the role of the shadowy intermediary RosUkrEnergo 
remained unclear.  Intermediaries were finally eliminated from sales to Ukraine in March 2008 when Naftogaz 




Russia and Turkmenistan agreed that Gazprom would make all payments in cash instead of 
the earlier barter arrangements, but the price remained $44 per thousand m
3.   
In CIS gas markets, greater transparency since 2006 has been accompanied by conflict over 
price increases, as Central Asian gas suppliers tried to benefit from continuing increases in 
oil prices.  Until 2006 Turkmen President Niyazov, who preferred to be known as 
Turkmenbashi the Great, appeared content with existing arrangements with Russia.
13 In April 
2006 he made a rare foreign trip to Beijing, whose main purpose was to negotiate a gas 
pipeline and long-term supply contract with China.  In May 2006 construction began on the 
7,000 kilometre long pipeline from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the 
Chinese border where it connects to the Chinese gas pipeline network. After Turkmenbashi 
died in December 2006, his successor Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov continued the 
process of diversifying export routes for his country's gas (Pomfret, 2008).  China became a 
significant demander of Turkmenistan’s future gas output, and in July 2007 China signed a 
contract to buy 30 bcm a year.  At the same time, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) was granted drilling rights in Turkmenistan.
14   
Russia responded by signing agreements to build a new pipeline to increase Turkmenistan's 
gas export capacity to Russia, to transfer to the Turkmenistan government Soviet era 
geological data covering Turkmen energy deposits that had been kept in Moscow, and to 
increase the gas price received by Turkmenistan.  The agreements appeared to be a 
package deal to keep Turkmenistan within the Russian energy network.  The price increases 
are, however, bound to be destabilizing as they reduce Gazprom’s profits from the Turkmen 
trade. 
In May 2007 Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to build a ten 
billion m
3 a year pipeline along the eastern coast of the Caspian, the Prikaspiisky route, 
feeding into the Russian pipeline network.  The agreement was widely seen as a pre-emptive 
move to forestall Caspian gas going to China, but it did not stop the July 2007 Turkmenistan-
China agreement.  In December 2007 the proposed capacity of the Prikaspiisky pipeline was 
doubled, to carry 10 bcm from each of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.  In July 2008 it was 
increased further in order to accommodate larger deliveries from Turkmenistan.
   The 
                                                 
13 Apart from a small pipeline to Iran built in 1997, all of Turkmenistan's gas exports went by pipeline to Russia.  
Luca Anceschi  (2009, 95) observes that after 1998 Russia “de facto became the international patron of the 
increasingly sultanistic Turkmen regime”.  No non-Russian pipelines were built after that, confirming Russia’s 
monopoly, but by 2006 the temptation to obtain higher prices had become too great.  For more details of the 
corrupt and often bizarre practices surrounding Turkmenistan's gas trade under Turkmenbashi, see Garcia (2006) 
and Global Witness (2006). 
14 China’s heightened interest in Caspian energy (Kazakhstan’s oil as well as Turkmenistan’s natural gas) has, in 
part, been born out of frustration with Russia’s failure to guarantee supplies of its Far East energy to China 
(Blank, 2008).  Proposals for an energy club within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are aimed at 
moderating Russia-China energy conflicts, but the proposals have made no headway and tensions within the 
SCO are likely to grow after Russia’s support for secession by Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, which 




December 2007 agreement also called for modernization of the existing Central Asia - 
Centre pipeline from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to Russia, which would increase its 
annual capacity from the current 50+ bcm a year. 
The price from Gazprom was increased to $65 per thousand cubic metres in January 2006, 
and in September 2006 Turkmenistan negotiated an increase in the price received from 
Gazprom to $100 per 1,000 m
3 for 2007-9.  In November 2007 this was raised to $130 for the 
first half of 2008 and $150 for the second half of 2008.
15  On 28 January 2008 China agreed 
to pay $195 for the gas that it would obtain from Turkmenistan, but this included a $50 
premium to finance the Turkmenistan-China pipeline.  On 11 March 2008 Gazprom 
announced that it would pay ‘European’ prices for Central Asian gas in 2009, i.e. in the range 
of $200-300 per 1,000 m
3.  In sum, between 2006 and 2008 there was a substantial upward 
shift in the prices being agreed on trade involving Turkmenistan and its major customers, 
Russia and Ukraine. 
Long-term agreements, even if they have become more frequent and more readily 
adjustable, still lack flexibility to respond to changes in demand and supply conditions.  With 
the rapid decline in oil prices in 2008, Gazprom found that its revenues from the EU under 
the oil-related index price would fall while it had committed to high dollar amounts (reportedly 
$375.50 per thousand cubic metres) to Turkmenistan.  When Russia President Medvedev 
visited Turkmenistan in September 2009 it was anticipated that the pricing issue would be 
resolved, but when Turkmenistan refused to accept the proposed price cut Gazprom 
announced that it would not purchase any Turkmen gas in the remainder of 2009.  In the 
absence of sufficient completed pipelines to alternative markets, Turkmenistan faces loss of 
its major export revenue and will have to come to terms with Gazprom.  The 2009 dispute 
between Russia and Turkmenistan is only indirectly related to EU energy security concerns, 
but it illustrated Russia's willingness to use control over pipelines as a weapon to achieve its 
goals.
16   
 
                                                 
15 At the same time, Turkmenistan was receiving $75 per 1,000 m
3 from Iran and, when Turkmenistan tried to 
raise the price, Iran offered a super-premium price (reportedly $300) to Azerbaijan in February 2008 to teach 
Turkmenistan that Iran was not a captive market.  The conflict appeared to have been resolved by September 
2008 when Reza Kasaei-Zadeh, the Deputy Oil Minister in charge of the National Iranian Gas Company, 
announced that Iran would import 9.2 bcm from Turkmenistan in 2008 and hoped to increase the flow to14 bcm, 
the maximum amount set as the trade in the countries’ long-term agreement and that as of 1
st. January 2009 the 
price would float according to a formula linked to the price of various fuel products (interview with Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly,  reported in Tehran Times 16 September 2008). 
16 Earlier in 2009 a pipeline explosion, which many in Turkmenistan believed to be deliberate Gazprom sabotage, 
disrupted Turkmen gas exports.  The hardball Russia-Turkmenistan negotiations are in a context of increasing 
gas exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Russia.  In 2008 the three Central Asian governments, previously 
noted for their fractious relations, negotiated jointly with Gazprom.  In 2009 Gazprom seemed determined to 




4.   EU Gas Security 
 
 
EU concerns about the security of gas supplies from the CIS were raised in January 2006, 
when a Russia-Ukraine dispute involving Russia increasing its gas price to Ukraine and 
ensuing cuts in Russian gas supply to Ukraine had short-run spillover effects on European 
supplies.  The intra-CIS conflicts have often had a geopolitical component as well as pure 
commercial interests, with Russia more willing to put pressure on Georgia or Ukraine after 
the rose and orange revolutions of November 2003 and November 2004.  The Russian 
invasion of Georgia in August 2008 did not affect gas exports to the EU, but it did highlight 
the security risks that might be associated with a TransCaspian pipeline bypassing Russia 
and connecting Central Asian gas to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline.  The January 2009 
dispute over Russian gas supplies to Ukraine, once again and more seriously than in 2006, 
highlighted the dangers of over-reliance on Russia as a gas supplier to the EU and the 
disregard in which both Russia and Ukraine appeared to hold contractual obligations. 
A politicised gas relationship not only applies to intra-CIS trade, but is a central part of 
Russia’s European strategy.  This explains the failure of the EU-Russia “energy dialogue” of 
the late 1990s, the failure to secure Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty, and 
the failure to link Russia’s entry into the WTO to liberalisation of its gas sector. At the EU-
Russia summit in Sochi on 25 May 2006, Russia explicitly rejected proposals advanced by 
the EU to restructure and depoliticise the gas relationship (Noël, 2008). 
The EU has not been too concerned about gas prices.  The formula negotiated with Russia 
entailed the EU paying higher prices than reported spot prices in North America or Japanese 
LNG prices, but not by a large margin.  What the EU has been concerned with is security of 
supply.  This is in a context of internal disagreement about the appropriate relations with 
Russia, with countries keen to remain on good terms with Russia led by Germany and Italy, 
which together purchase almost half of Russian gas exports to the EU, and countries keen to 
reduce dependence on Russia as an energy supplier led by the UK, with the support of 
eastern European EU members.   The EU debate has thus largely boiled down to one over 
pipeline routes: should it support the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines proposed by 
Russia,
17 or should it encourage construction of a TransCaspian pipeline and the Nabucco 
project that would allow the EU to import gas from Central Asia without relying on Russia for 
transit? 
                                                 
17 The Nord Stream pipeline would pass under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany and South Stream would 




Several proposals to construct a gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea and then through 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey were aired during the 1990s and early 2000s, but the 
project was eventually limited to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey 
which opened in late 2006.
18  The TransCaspian portion was only resurrected after 
Turkmenbashi’s death in December 2006.  In August 2007 the USA granted $1.7 million to 
Azerbaijan for a feasibility study on TransCaspian oil and gas pipelines, and on 29 February 
2008 Azerbaijan’s state energy company, SOCAR, awarded the feasibility study contract to a 
US firm, KBR.  The TransCaspian would link up to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline and the 
proposed Nabucco pipeline from Turkey to Hungary via Bulgaria and Romania.  The 
feasibility of the TransCaspian and Nabucco projects is linked, because Turkmen supplies 
are needed to justify Nabucco’s capacity.
19 
The economic attractiveness of Nabucco to Western European buyers depends upon the 
capacity of and the terms for Russian gas transiting the proposed, and competing, South 
Stream pipeline from southern Russia to Italy via Serbia.  The prospects for a TransCaspian 
pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to EU markets also depend upon the support of potential 
investors within the EU.  At the Community level, EU policy has become slightly more active 
since 2007.  In April 2008 the Commission proposed extending the mandate of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) to permit lending to Central Asian borrowers; this amendment was 
approved by the European Parliament, and is believed to be clearing the way for EU 
investment in energy infrastructure.  In January 2009 the Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso commented on the Russia-Ukraine dispute’s implications for the EU in 
strong terms,  saying that "If the agreement [to supply EU customers] is not honoured, it 
means that Russia and Ukraine can no longer be regarded as reliable".
20  The post-2007 
rapprochement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan should facilitate exploration of the 
southern Caspian to the benefit of both countries, and could herald a positive commitment to 
the TransCaspian pipeline by two key Caspian gas producers.
21 
                                                 
18 In 1999-2000 the US government funded a $750,000 feasibility study by Enron for a pipeline supplying gas 
from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Turkey, but the project fell afoul of poor relations between Turkmenbashi 
and President Heydar Aliev of Azerbaijan. 
19 Some Azeri commentators believe that Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field could produce enough gas to justify 
Nabucco’s planned capacity of 30 bcm a year, but most observers doubt this.  Iran might also provide gas for 
Nabucco and the EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs has flagged this prospect (reported in Khadija 
Ismayilova “Azerbaijan: Baku hesitates on Nabucco pipeline project”, posted on www.eurasianet.org 10 April 
2008), but even if Iran were willing and able to supply gas it is likely to be effectively vetoed by the USA. 
20 Barroso told the European Parliament that the dispute between Ukraine and Russia was “most unacceptable 
and incredible” and that, if agreements sponsored by the European Union are not observed “as a matter of 
urgency”, he would advise energy companies that have deals with Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy, to file lawsuits 
against them; reported on 14 January 2009 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7827829.st  In March 2009 the 
EU and Ukraine issued a joint declaration emphasizing cooperation in gas deliveries, which was resented by 
Russia 
21 In 2007 relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan warmed as Turkmenistan reopened its Embassy in 
Baku, which had been closed since 2001, and in June proposals were announced for joint exploration of the 
Serdar/Kapaz field under the South Caspian Sea.  In March 2008 a high level delegation from Turkmenistan 




Nevertheless, the financial prospects for the pipeline have become less positive in the post-
2008 era of lower energy prices.  There is also an issue of whether Turkmenistan has 
sufficient gas, possibly augmented by gas from Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, to fill an 
economical pipeline given Turkmenistan's commitments to Russia, China and Iran  By the 
2020s Turkmenistan has commitments to supply 80 bcm a year through Russia and 30 bcm 
a year to China as well as up to 14 bcm a year to Iran, and is negotiating perhaps 30 bcm a 
year through the TransCaspian and perhaps supplies to South Asia.  If Turkmenistan's gas 
production (66 bcm in 2008) can be more than doubled over the next decade and a half, then 
all these commitments and dreams might be satisfied
22 -- but, if not, then Turkmenistan will 
have no gas left to supply another new pipeline. 
 
 
5.   In the Long-term Russia's Gas Power will Decline - but how 
far off is that? 
 
 
Concerns about EU gas security centre on the role of Russia as supplier of a quarter of EU 
gas through a pipeline system that can be disrupted by conflicts between Russia and 
Ukraine.  The extent to which such concerns continue to be valid depends upon Russia's 
ability to produce gas (and sell it to EU customers) and the availability of alternative sources 
of supply. 
Estimates of gas reserves and future production costs are uncertain.  Russia's existing gas 
fields are running out and future production will rely on development of the Shtokman field in 
the Barents Sea, Yamal in the far north of Siberia and Far Eastern gas fields.  Some western 
commentators argue that, especially since 2004, Gazprom has become technically inefficient 
and incapable of generating the physical capital to implement large new projects, although it 
is difficult to verify this claim.
23  The erosion of favourable arrangements with Central Asian 
                                                                                                                                                          
countries acknowledged the debts, in 1991-3 they both still used the rouble, whose hard-currency value was 
disputed.  Turkmenistan sought $56 million while Azerbaijan offered $18 million; under the March 2008 
agreement Azerbaijan will pay $44.8 million. 
22 External analysts are, not surprisingly given the secrecy surrounding the country’s reserves, divided over the 
long-term potential; Marina Tsygankova (2008) contrasts Turkmen claims of 2030 production levels around 250 
bcm with the scepticism of International Energy Agency (IEA) Reports about whether Turkmenistan can increase 
production at all.  In 2008 President Berdymukamedov initiated an independent assessment of the country's gas 
reserves by a British firm, Gaffney Cline & Associates, whose preliminary findings, based on the South Yolotan 
field, are optimistic about the extent of Turkmenistan's reserves.  In December 2009 Turkmengaz awarded to a 
group consisting of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Abu Dhabi’s Petrofac Emirates, Dubai’s Gulf 
Oil and Gas, and South Korea’s LG International and Hyundai Engineering the rights to develop the South 
Yolotan field, which is thought to contain about 6 trillion cubic metres of gas. 
23 See, for example, Anders Åslund's speech before the European People’s Party, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 15 May 2008 or Michael Mihalka (2008).  Jonathan Stern (2009) is more optimistic about Russian 




producers has already put more pressure on Russia to meet its EU commitments out of own 
resources, and this will be even more true after the Turkmenistan-China pipeline becomes 
operational.
24  Domestic market reforms will bring Russia's domestic prices closer to world 
prices, reducing domestic demand and freeing up more gas for export.  On the other hand, 
the location of the new gas fields may favour delivery to Asian rather than European markets.  
Although prediction is difficult, it seems likely that supply constraints will reduce Russia's 
share in EU gas markets over the next decade. 
A TransCaspian and Nabucco pipeline would further erode Russian market power by 
providing EU countries, especially those to the south and east, with an alternative pipeline 
source.  Pipeline economics are, however, complex, given the large upfront construction 
costs, the mutually exclusive nature of projects the long life of pipelines and the uncertainty 
of future gas prices.  On all of these counts the financial viability of the 
TransCaspian/Nabucco can be questioned, although the political support (from the USA as 
well as the EU) could help to assuage the doubts. 
The biggest challenge to the long-term viability of gas pipelines is technological.  The future 
prospects of Russia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia as gas suppliers to the EU will be affected 
by technical change in transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG).  Advances in liquefying, in 
specialized ships and in degasification terminals are eroding the dominance of pipelines as 
the least-cost delivery mode for gas.  This will benefit suppliers with ocean port access such 
as Qatar or Australia, at the cost of landlocked gas suppliers. 
The diffusion process for LNG was slow in the three decades after the first liquefication unit 
came into operation in Algeria in 1964 and the second plant in Alaska in 1969.  Mads 
Greaker and Eirik Lund Sagen (2008) argue that this was due to monopoly behaviour.   
Additionally, in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s there was little incentive to invest in LNG 
facilities when energy prices were low.  The fall in costs and the rate of construction of new 
plants accelerated after 1999 when competing technologies became available.  Expensive 
projects need to be coordinated; liquefication facilities have little use without regasification 
capacity at the point of importation.  During the 2000s Qatar took the lead in building LNG 
liquefication terminals and shipping capacity, as well as co-financing some regasification 
plants, and this in turn led to greater LNG trade and increased exploration of offshore gas 
fields.   
The biggest liquefication plant, Ras Laffan in Qatar, built at a cost of $60 billion, produces a 
quarter of the world's LNG.  As of 29 December 2008, there were 300 ships engaged in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
argues that under Putin Russia was more concerned about nationalizing natural resource companies, even if this 
meant discouraging foreign investors with the technical capacity to develop the country's gas reserves.  Pauline 
Jones Luong  and Erika Weinthal (2006) also emphasise the role of domestic politics and institutions in 
determining economic outcomes in CIS energy producing countries. 
24 There are also proposals to link Central Asia to the booming South Asian markets, but progress is unlikely as 




deep-sea movement of LNG (up from 150 in 2003), and there were more than 140 vessels 
on order at the world's shipyards.  The majority of the new ships under construction are in the 
size of 120,000 m³ to 140,000 m
3, but there are orders for ships with capacity up to 260,000 
m³.
   The largest Q-Max tankers, which cost $300 million, not only benefit from scale 
economies but also have technological advantages, e.g. they carry a unit to capture and 
liquefy gases that escape from the storage tanks during the journey (on older ships about 
0.14% of the LNG escapes every day).  Among newly discovered offshore gas fields, the 
Gorgon project off Western Australia, with Chevron as lead investor in a joint venture which 
will invest $36 billion, will catapult Australia from its current sixth position in LNG output to 
second, behind Qatar, in 2014. 
There are about a dozen operational LNG regasification terminals in the EU, including five in 
Spain (Barcelona, Bilbao, Huelva, Sagunto (Valencia), and El Mussel), three in the UK 
(South Hook and  Dragon at Milford Haven in South Wales and Isle of Grain in Kent), two in 
France (Fos-sur-Mer and Montoir) and one in Belgium.  It is difficult to keep track because 
many are recent, and over fifty LNG regasification terminal projects are either under 
consideration or have commenced construction in the EU (in Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Lithuania and a joint project between Estonia and 
Finland).  The South Hook terminal, a joint venture between Qatar Petroleum, Exxon Mobil 
and Total which opened in May 2009, is Europe's largest, supplying 11 bcm per year on 
opening and anticipated to quickly reach a capacity of 21 bcm. 
These developments suggest that the era of gas pipelines' domination may be close to 
extinction.  If LNG can be delivered in a spot market at prices that compete with pipeline-
delivered gas, then it is unlikely that large new pipelines can be economic and customers for 
gas delivered along existing pipelines will be less exposed to hold-up tactics in periods of 
scarcity.  This has major implications for the CIS gas suppliers and for EU gas importers. 
Russia is already switching its attention in the Far East from pipelines to LNG, which 
provides greater flexibility in selecting where to sell the gas and avoids dependence on a 
monopoly buyer.
25  Although much of the publicity had focused on whether pipelines will 
connect to China or to Japan, ExxonMobil, the lead developer of Sakhalin-I, has placed 
emphasis since 2004 on LNG and exports have gone to the USA, and Mexico inter alia.  
LNG has also been exported from Sakhalin-II.  Looking further ahead, liquefication may 
become the best option for delivering gas from Russia's Arctic Ocean gas fields if global 
warming increases the ice-free shipping season.  Such options are not available to the 
landlocked Central Asian and Caspian producers, who may come to rue their failure to build 
pipelines and develop gas exports while they still had value. 
                                                 
25 Gazprom has also announced that gas from the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea will be exported as LNG 




For the EU the establishment of an efficient LNG world market with virtually unlimited 
availability at the current spot price will mean the end of gas security concerns, although in 
the short-term there will be country-specific implications.  Until the establishment of a single 
EU gas market, the LNG option will be especially valuable to countries with their own 
regasification facilities such as Spain and France.  In 2008 Spain purchased LNG from 
Australia in the spot market, providing striking evidence that the EU’s dependence on 
importing gas by pipeline may be ending and that gas can be sourced worldwide.  It is also 
noteworthy that after 2006 the UK began preparing for the decline of its North Sea gas 
production by a vigorous regasification plant construction program.
26 
Most striking for the debates about pipeline projects is that Italy too has embraced LNG 
imports, which is bad news for the viability of either South Stream or Nabucco.  Italian energy 
companies had difficulty obtaining local government permission to build regasification plant, 
but by 2009 this had been resolved by constructing three large offshore terminals.  The first 
offshore LNG regasification facility was built by the Italian utility Edison in conjunction with 
ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum in the Adriatic Sea 40 kilometres south of Venice.  A 
second regasification plant is under construction near Brindisi, with a proposed capacity of 
16 bcm and the third, Toscana Offshore, is near Livorno on Italy's west coast.
27  These 
projects are especially relevant to the contest between the proposed South Stream and 
Nabucco pipelines, because added LNG capacity of 20-30 bcm per year is equivalent to a 
substantial additional pipeline to Italy and thus reduces the likelihood that either new pipeline 
could be profitable. 
The most stubborn resistance to importing LNG among large EU members is from Germany, 
which remains committed to the Nord Stream project despite opposition from most north-
eastern EU members.
28  The cost of the project has escalated since the agreement was 
signed in 2005, in part because of opposition from Finland and Sweden to the original route 
                                                 
26 In 2006 the Langeled pipeline was built from Norway to the UK under the North Sea, but after that the UK focus 
shifted to very large LNG terminals, especially those in South Wales which were located to receive very large 
ocean-going ships. 
27 Toscana Offshore was delayed by ecological concerns, and is smaller than the others, with a capacity of 3 bcm.  
Contracts have been signed with Nigeria and Qatar to supply one bcm per year apiece.  The project includes the 
acquisition of an existing LNG carrier and its conversion into a Floating Storage and Re-gasification Unit with a 
storage capacity of 137,000 m
3, at a cost of around 600 million euros, for which the European investment Bank 
provided a 200 million euro loan in April 2008.  The EIB's objectives explicitly mentioned energy security "The 
project will increase EU and Italy gas import capacity and contribute to meeting the gap resulting from growing 
demand and declining indigenous gas production in Italy. It will also enhance the security of supply by allowing 
imports diversification from a growing number of LNG producing countries and enhance competition in the Italian 
gas market."  http://www.eib.europa.eu/projects/pipeline/2006/20060560.htm 
28 Background on Nord Stream is provided by Bendik Solum Whist (2008).  The opposition has had differing focus 
with Sweden concerned about military implications, Finland about environmental issues and the Baltic countries 
about security of their own energy supplies from the CIS.  Poland, which is less directly implicated because it is 
unaffected by the route and its primary energy is largely provided by domestic coal, seems to be most disturbed 
by the political implications of closer Russian-German ties.  Sweden and Finland have diversified domestically 




which passed under waters over which they had rights under the Law of the Sea.
29  
Nevertheless, German support for the Nord Stream project remains strong, and, although 
Germany argues that Nord Stream is a European project to enhance EU energy security 
(and the EU granted it the status of Trans-Europe Network in 2002), German support reflects 
national concerns about domestic gas supplies and about relations with Russia.
30 
Germany's domestic energy imbalance was exacerbated by the 2000 decision to phase out 
nuclear power by 2022, which led to increased dependence on imported energy, first and 
foremost gas from Russia.  Alternative solutions to Germany's energy problems include 
construction of LNG terminals or establishing an integrated EU gas market, in which gas 
could be imported via pipelines from the large Atlantic or Mediterranean LNG terminals, but 
Germany has shunned either of these options, and has been, together with France, the 
principal opponent of deregulation and integration of EU gas markets, preferring to maintain 
market segregation with national champions enjoying monopoly supplier status.   
Deregulation and creation of an integrated EU market for gas is, however, the logical EU 
outcome, undermining both the position of Russian gas in the German market and the 
profitability of Nord Stream. 
Alignments within the EU on the two issues of an integrated EU gas market and a non-
confrontational approach to Russia overlap, with the UK and Eastern European countries in 
favour of the integrated market but sceptical of Russia's intentions, and Germany and France 
opposing market integration but more accommodating towards Russia.  How these positions 
will be reconciled is unclear and it will take time, but whatever the eventual EU consensus 
the factors analysed in this section will work against Russia's "Gas Power" because EU 
countries will diversify their sources of energy away from natural gas and their sources of gas 
away from Russia. 
 
                                                 
29 Finland's requested in 2007 that the pipeline should pass under Estonian waters rather than across the more 
difficult seabed under Finnish waters, but in 2008 Estonia rejected the request and Nord Stream returned to 
negotiations with Finland.  In 2008 the governments of both Sweden and Finland rejected the initial environmental 
impact assessments presented by the consortium. 
30 The Nord Stream agreement was signed in September 2005 in the presence of Chancellor Schroeder and 
Prime Minister Putin.  The Schroeder government authorized a loan guarantee of one billion euros to Gazprom, 
which has a 51% share in the Nord Stream consortium, weeks before the end of the government's term in office.  
Schroeder subsequently became Chair of the consortium.  Despite the project's EU Trans-Europe Network status, 
the consortium chose to incorporate in Switzerland, where it can benefit from secrecy laws to reduce the project's 




6.   Conclusions 
 
 
From the perspective of EU energy security there are parallels between current concerns 
about dependence on Russian gas and 1973, when after decades of artificially low oil prices 
energy importers suddenly seemed hostage to the power of a few oil exporters (and briefly 
did suffer insecurity when the Netherlands was subject to an oil embargo).  There was, 
however, a spot market for oil and, as high prices led to the emergence of new producers, 
OPEC lost its power.  Since the early 1980s, any importer can obtain oil, at a price, and 
energy security issues now focus more on gas, where pipeline networks limit the feasible 
sources of supply and have left several EU gas importers vulnerable to disruption of supply 
from Russia. 
The ability of any supplier or group of suppliers with monopoly power in the provision of a 
crucial good to turn this power into political influence sufficient to threaten the security of 
importers depends upon the time horizon, the existence of substitutes and technological 
change, which may all be interconnected.  Coal in the nineteenth century and oil in the 1970s 
were prime candidates for security concerns because they were important inputs into a 
modern economy and appeared to be without close substitutes.  In both cases, elasticities of 
demand and supply were low in the short-run, but the elasticities proved to be higher in the 
long-run as customers economized in the use of the fuel and as new sources of supply were 
found and with technological change.  Some of the technological change was exogenous, as 
in the replacement of trains pulled by coal-fired steam engine by the petroleum-driven car as 
a preferred means of transport, but much was endogenous, e.g. more fuel-efficient cars were 
developed after the 1970s oil shocks.  
As with earlier concerns about energy security, current EU fears of dependence on Russia 
will be transient.  Russia's currently large market share, about a quarter of gas supplies in the 
EU, will likely fall due to supply-side problems, notably declining yields from Russia's existing 
gas fields and difficulty developing the new fields.  Dependence on Russian gas arises not 
simply from market share but also from pipelines being the least-cost delivery mode for gas 
and from the existing pipeline network, which directs not just Russian gas but also Central 
Asian gas through Russian-controlled pipelines.  This situation could change if new pipeline 
routes were opened, such as the TransCaspian-Nabucco route, although this is likely to 
require substantial support from Western governments and EU members are split about the 
desirability of Russian versus non-Russian pipelines.   
More importantly, the rapid development of LNG facilities will have huge implications for both 




have options to ship gas from its growing Far Eastern and Arctic operations to the customers 
in Asia, Europe or the Americas willing to pay the best price.  The landlocked Central Asian 
producers, on the other hand, will remain bound by pipeline routes and largely dependent on 
Russian and Chinese markets.  Construction of LNG regasification terminals is giving EU 
importers the option of buying gas in a spot market with many suppliers, although this 
development is being embraced to varying degrees by individual EU members and without 
an integrated EU gas market the LNG option will not be available to all countries.  Precisely 
how the spot market for natural gas will develop is uncertain, but the pipeline issues and the 
Russian threat to EU energy security will become as anachronistic as 1970s fears of OPEC 
world domination. 
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